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Main Stages and Ten den cies
in Trans for ma tion of Ukrai nian So ci ety:
From Peres troika to Or ange Rev o lu tion*
Ab stract
This ar ti cle is deal ing with the anal y sis of main stages and ten den cies
of so cial trans for ma tions that have been taken place in Ukraine since
the well-known Peres troika in the ex-USSR. Transformational pro ces -
ses are stud ied in very im por tant ways for Ukrai nian so ci ety as pects,
such as: in sti tu tional, socio-struc tural, and socio-psy cho log i cal. The
au thors gave spe cial at ten tion on the role of classes — elites and the
broad masses in the dif fer ent stages of this pe riod have been an a lyzed.
In Ukraine, like in other post-So viet coun tries for over 20 years (start -
ing from the time when neo-no men cla ture leader Mikhail Gorbachev,
came to power and up to the cur rent post-Or ange stage of so cial
changes), so cial trans for ma tions are tak ing place and are wait ing to be
com pre hended. So ci ol o gists were lucky be cause Peres troika was ac -
com pa nied by grad ual dis ap pear ance of ideo log i cal bans on sur veys
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A re port at the ple nary ses sion “The Role of Classes, Elites, and Pub lic in So cial Trans for ma -
tions in Ukraine” (18–19 May 2006, Kyiv, In sti tute of So ci ol ogy of the Na tional Acad emy of Sci enc -
es of Ukraine). In Ukrai nian and Rus sian firstly pub lished in the jour nal “Sotsio lohiia: teoriia,
metody, marketynh”, 2006, ¹ 3, pp. 32–51.
deal ing with the pub lic opin ion, mass es ti ma tions of eco nomic and
sociopolitical sit u a tion, val ues and ori en ta tions of peo ple. Po lit i cal cen -
sor ship weak ened and came to an end to gether with peo ple’s fears of
pos si ble neg a tive con se quences aris ing from their openly ex pressed opi -
n ions in con ver sa tions with so ci ol o gists. As a re sult, Ukrai nian so ci ol o -
gists gained the data of nu mer ous sur veys on the dy nam ics of the mass
con scious ness, psy cho log i cal state , so cial well-be ing of the peo ple, their 
at ti tudes to ward the lead er ship and po lit i cal in sti tu tions and  spe cific
fea tures of com pre hen sion of eth nic, so cial and class re la tions in so ci -
ety. Among such so cio log i cal data, spe cial at ten tion should be paid to
the data of the long-term mon i tor ing on so cial changes in Uk raine, con -
ducted by the In sti tute of So ci ol ogy, NASU (1992-2006), the gen er al ized
re sults of which be came a base for the con cep tual con clu sions pre -
sented by this ar ti cle. We also used the re sults of polls con ducted by us
at the So cio log i cal De part ment of the In sti tute of Phi los o phy, Na tional
Acad emy of Sci ences of the Ukrai nian So viet So cial ist Re pub lic and
All-Ukrai nian De part ment of the All-Un ion Cen ter for Pub lic Opin ion
Stud ies (1986-1991). Many ideas (briefly men tioned in this ar ti cle) were
sub stan ti ated in a num ber of pub li ca tions pre pared by us in re cent
years. The em pir i cal in for ma tion is widely avail able due to the works
pub lished pre vi ously, so we con cen trated our anal y sis mainly on logics
of the so cial trans for ma tions of the re cent two de cades and spe cific
char ac ter of so cial changes in the as pects de ter min ing Ukrai nian  so -
ciety: in sti tu tional, socio-struc tural and socio-psy cho log i cal.  Spe cial
at ten tion was paid to the role of classes, elites and pub lic at the dif fer ent
stages of this so cial trans for ma tion. 
So cial Changes dur ing Peres troika
and the In sti tu tional Burst of 1991
In Ukraine, so cial trans for ma tions are mostly de ter mined by his tor i -
cal ex pe ri ence re lated to for ma tion of in sti tu tional, so cial and class
struc ture of the so ci ety, as well as the ba sis type of per son al ity in the so -
viet sys tem, which, in the 1980s, found it self in a swiftly de vel op ing so -
cial and eco nomic cri sis that later gained a po lit i cal com po nent; the cri -
sis led to col lapse of the So viet Un ion and es tab lish ment of new in de -
pend ent coun tries on its ru ins. For cit i zens of the USSR and most for eign 
an a lysts, the dra matic end of Gorbachev’s Perestroika was un ex pected
and in ex pli ca ble in many as pects. Even now, when ap pro pri ate ness and
in ev i ta bil ity of changes are ob vi ous, it is not easy to sub stan ti ate the in -
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ev i ta ble col lapse of the coun try pre tended to be the world leader, hav ing
huge nat u ral and hu man re sources, the sta ble so cial struc ture, the  pri -
vileged and united, as it seemed, power elites, the public that expressed
support to the power and dominant ideology. 
The fol low ing main com po nents of the sus tain able in sti tu tional sys -
tem: 1) laws de ter min ing le gal ity of so cial or der, 2) em brac ing in sti tu -
tional in fra struc ture that in volved a mighty re pres sive ma chine and the
power ver ti cal mech a nism proved by the time, and lastly 3) con sent of
most peo ple to ac cept the So viet way of life as nat u ral, mostly ad mis si ble
and so le git i mate. These com po nents could sup port the coun try in its
ex is tence de spite se ri ous eco nomic prob lems, oppositional moods of
some part of cre ative in tel li gen tsia, un fa vor able for eign con di tions and
lo cal mil i tary de feats. So the wors en ing eco nomic sit u a tion, west ern
pres sure, war in Af ghan i stan or sep a rat ist moods in some re pub lics
could seem good rea sons ex plain ing the USSR’s col lapse only for those
who were out side the coun try, where fan tas ti cally stu pid Andropov’s
meth ods for strength en ing dis ci pline were met with the mass en thu si -
asm, where a long queue of in tel lec tu als wanted to be come mem bers of
the Com mu nist Party or re serv ists of the Min is try of For eign Af fairs in or -
der to visit other coun tries (the price was co op er a tion with KGB), where
an al ways enor mous num ber of peo ple were ready to par tic i pate in great
con struc tion pro jects or liq ui da tion of tech no log i cal di sas ters, where
the dis si dent move ment was prac ti cally wiped off. 
 To our mind, the coun try was not ready for the in sti tu tional cri sis and 
the col lapse, and the fol low ing trans for ma tions in most post-So viet
coun tries (ex clud ing Bal tic ones) have proved it. Af ter fif teen years of in -
de pend ent ex is tence, the post-So viet coun tries could not  reach the so -
viet level of GNP, most are ruled with au thor i tar ian meth ods sup ported
by a ma jor ity of the pop u la tion and re strained mainly by in ter na tional
pres sure. How ever, this ar ti cle is de voted to so cial trans for ma tions in
Ukraine, and so we will not dis cuss gen eral prob lems of post-So viet so -
cial changes. It is only worth men tion ing that at first Ukrai nian so ci ety
did not dif fer in sti tu tion ally from Rus sia or Belarus. Mass con scious -
ness, social and class structures and  levels of life were the same. 
What was the de ci sive stim u lus for cru cial so cial changes in this
case? It hap pened so that the be gin ning of post-So viet trans for ma tions
was con nected to two key events: Mikhail Gorbachev’s com ing to power
and the Chernobyl di sas ter. The first event pro moted a search for new
ways of de vel op ment for the So viet so ci ety af ter a long pe riod of stag nant
geron to cracy. The sec ond event re vealed a dead threat for the State: the
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syn drome (formed in a closed so ci ety) of peo ple’s ir re spon si bil ity, while
deal ing with mod ern tech nol o gies fraught with to tal di sas ters. As a re -
sult, the re ju ve na tion team of so viet lead ers chose the way of ex per i -
ments in or der to lib er ate so cial ini tia tives hav ing been re strained for a
long time; this led to the col lapse of the coun try, which could not ex ist
with out any to tal i tar ian ide ol ogy mor tar ing all the dif fer ent com po nents
to gether. The in sti tu tional col lapse was pushed by pres sure from the
West which was more ef fec tive in econ omy and more united in ide ol ogy
and  will ing to lib er ate so cial ist coun tries from so viet dic ta tor ship and
its sup port (be com ing a big burden for the stagnate economy of the
USSR) of anti-west regimes in countries of the third world.
In gen eral, such ex pla na tion look  plau si ble. How ever, even un der
such dif fi cult con di tions, the So viet lead ers had a real way to save the
coun try and its in sti tu tional ba sis, if the strat egy (op po site to Gor ba -
chev’s Peres troika and pub lic ity) of po lit i cal close ness had been ac -
cepted. An ex am ple was dem on strated by Yuriy Andropov just be fore
Peres troika. In the mass con scious ness of Rus sians, Belarusians and
even Ukrai ni ans, Andropov is still one of the most at trac tive po lit i cal
lead ers. Sim i lar strat egy was adopted by China, where the com mu nist
ide ol ogy, party dic ta tor ship and po lit i cal cen sor ship were com bined with 
el e ments of mar ket econ omy and modernization of peo ple’s way of life. At 
the same time, there was a sig nif i cant dif fer ence be tween the USSR and
China. This dif fer ence is usu ally re lated to spe cific fea tures of dif fer ent
cul tures and psy chol ogy, but peo ple rarely pay at ten tion to the fact that
the pow er ful elite, that was changed due to the mass re pres sions and
am bi tious new com ers from the party lower strata who filled the empty
places, came to power in China 20 years later than in the USSR. Where,
af ter the Sta lin’s ep och, no men cla ture be came sa cral and un touch able.
Such slow changes in the most de sir able so cial po si tions along with
swift growth in the group of pre tend ers for the high places in the status
hierarchy, became a mighty stimulus to start transformations in Soviet
society. 
As was shown in sur veys on so cial and pro fes sional ori en ta tions from
the 1970s, long be fore Peres troika was in the con scious ness of gen er a -
tions en ter ing their in de pend ent lives, the pro fes sions and posts lead ing
to the high est places in the so cial hi er ar chy be came ob jects of the mass
ori en ta tions —  while the mass pro fes sions and or di nary posts were un -
at trac tive for the ma jor ity of young peo ple. The growth in so cial and sta -
tus claims be came a source of destabilization for the formed so cial hi er -
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ar chy be cause un re al ized ex pec ta tions led to grow ing dis sat is fac tion
with the social system among most new groups. 
  New priv i leged so cial po si tions were needed in or der to sat isfy new
am bi tions and claims and they could not be re al ized within the lim ited
and ideo log i cally closed no men cla ture. There were too many pre tend ers
for a lim ited area of so viet elites; the tested Bolshevik method of shoot ing 
the old one and feed ing a new no men cla ture could not be used any more;
so, the only way was to ap ply some un re stricted so cial and eco nomic
mea sures and to di rect the grow ing thirst of gain ing en trance into the
pri vate eco nomic ini tia tive sphere. How ever, this way was not very at trac -
tive for cre ative and sci en tific in tel li gen tsia full of ca pa ble and am bi tious 
peo ple ready for ca reer growth and gain ing cor re spond ing priv i leges.
Pro fes sor D. Lane in his book “The Rise and Fall of State So cial ism. In -
dus trial So ci ety and the So cial ist State” un der lined the spe cial role in tel -
li gen tsia played in Peres troika, as sum ing that among highly qual i fied
spe cial ists of in tel lec tual la bor, there were peo ple mostly ori ented to ward 
mar ket econ omy and po lit i cal plu ral ism. That’s of course is cor rect. But
we have to say that, dur ing Peres troika, cre ative and sci en tific in tel li gen -
tsia was es pe cially ac tive in re moval of lim i ta tions that re stricted their
self-ex pres sion and ca reer growth in cre ative un ions, sci en tific and ed u -
ca tional in sti tu tions. Those peo ple sup plied the neo-no men cla ture with
their rep re sen ta tives af ter the fail ure of the SCSE and the fol low ing in sti -
tu tional burst. 
The in sti tu tional burst as we un der stand it, is an al ter na tive to evo lu -
tional changes in so cial in sti tu tions, quick all-em brac ing in sti tu tional
re or ga ni za tion and es tab lish ment of new laws in so cial life. In the So viet
so ci ety dur ing Peres troika, grad u ally weak en ing in sti tu tional grounds
suited as a whole the newly formed no men cla ture in the rul ing struc -
tures of the USSR and of most of its re pub lics. How ever, this pro cess did
not suit a tra di tional priv i leged layer — it could lose its po si tions as a
 result of evolutional changes. Now we know why heads of all law en force -
ment de part ments and the de fense in dus try en tered the SCSE: namely
their in fra struc ture and per son nel could suffer from governmental
chan ges to the most extent. 
The Putsch of Au gust of 1991 played a key role in the col lapse of the
USSR. The old no men cla ture dem on strated their hes i ta tion and or ga ni -
za tional im po tence. This fi nally con vinced peo ple that the old sys tem
would not do any thing good for “or di nary peo ple”.  At the end of the year,
when the eco nomic sit u a tion wors ened so that a threat of hun ger be -
came a re al ity, na tional bu reau cra cies seemed to be closer and more per -
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spec tive for peo ple than the USSR gov ern men tal los ers. That is why the
peo ple, who sup ported main tain ing the USSR at the March ref er en dum,
were in dif fer ent to its liq ui da tion as a re sult of the Belovezh agree ment.
The spe cial role in the liq ui da tion was played by Ukraine, where two
years of Peres troika made it pos si ble for the pow er ful elite to ap pre ci ate
ad van tages of in de pend ence in com par i son to dic ta tor ship, while the
pop u la tion be lieved in the ex cep tional eco nomic power of the coun try,
de vel op ment of which was strained by chains of the USSR. More over, at
that time, in the mass con scious ness, there was a ro man tic at ti tude to
de moc racy en sur ing high liv ing stan dards as it was in de vel oped cap i tal -
ist coun tries. Al though the Com mu nist Party of Ukraine was for mally
banned, “the unity of party and peo ple” was main tained. The pow er ful
elite, the dem o cratic op po si tion and the ma jor ity of peo ple sup ported
fur ther in de pend ence of the coun try. It seems that namely Ukraine play -
ed a key role in the end of the idea about a re newed un ion, so long as
Yeltsin and his Rus sian col leagues ad mit ted var i ous op tions to main tain 
the for mer re pub lics as a united coun try (if only M.Gorbachev was re -
moved from power).
We think no one would deny the ex plo sive na ture of the changes in the 
in sti tu tional basis of the So viet so ci ety, which hap pened as a re sult of
the col lapse of the USSR and the ac com pa ny ing po lit i cal, eco nomic and
socio-cul tural trans for ma tions. It would be enough to men tion the phe -
nom e non of the col lapse of the super-power, the lost dom i na tion in the
com mu nist ide ol ogy, liq ui da tion of the sin gle party in sti tu tion, liq ui da -
tion of the State prop erty in sti tu tion mo nop oly and dis ap pear ance of
odi ous to tal i tar ian in sti tu tions in the spir i tual life. It is dif fi cult to name
at least one so cial in sti tute not be ing de stroyed com pletely or par tially as 
a re sult of post-So viet changes. Prin ci pal changes were not reg is tered
only in the in sti tute of the fam ily. Old so cial in sti tutes were de stroyed
with the help of laws, and then in sti tu tional or ga ni za tions were re or ga -
nized rad i cally. Even if, at first, it was not very eco nom i cally ef fi cient, pri -
vat iza tion of the State prop erty was le gally grounded and this en sured
ab sence of the gov ern men tal mo nop oly in in dus try and trade. Even if, in
the post-So viet coun tries, the in sti tute of ex ec u tive power looks like the
so viet party mo nop oly, its pow ers, le gally de ter mined, and the way of its
func tion ing (based on dem o cratic elec tions) prin ci pally dif fer from the
sin gle party in sti tute. So, we can state with con fi dence that, as a re sult
of post-com mu nist trans for ma tions, old so cial in sti tutes that en sured
cer tain social stability and integrity of society lost at least two of three of
their institutional attributes: legality and organizational infrastructure. 
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At that time, new ba sic so cial in sti tutes arose and got their le gal ity
prac ti cally si mul ta neously: the pres i den tial ver ti cal line of the power, the 
mul ti party sys tem with out dom i na tion of the banned CPSU, pri vate
prop erty and large-scale busi ness, and de-ideo log i cal law en force ment
struc tures. An ab so lutely new in sti tu tional in fra struc ture was cre ated;
at that time, it was widely sup ported by the pop u la tion and started to
gain its le git i mate sta tus. How ever, there was an in sti tu tional par a dox:
the le git i mate sta tus was given to a sys tem of in sti tu tions un able to ex e -
cute what was nec es sary for sup port of the de clared norms and val ues of
a dem o cratic so ci ety. Pow er ful elites were not ready to have dis cus sions
with the pub lic and op po si tion, the ju di cial power still de pended on the
ex ec u tive one, en tre pre neurs felt that their prop erty was sto len from the
gov ern ment; and sci ence, cul ture and ed u ca tion were still the last in the
list of gov ern men tal econ omy pref er ences. De spite the de clared sup port
of the mar ket econ omy, po lit i cal de moc racy and le gal State, the mass
con scious ness was still full of paternalist ste reo types, psy chol ogy of de -
pend ence on the gov ern ment and help less ness against its tyr anny. In
other words, Ukraine was ready to destroy the old institutional system to 
the same extent as it was not ready to establish a new one. 
Re strain Strat egy of In sti tu tional Changes:
1992–1994 
In Ukraine, at the be gin ning of 1992 was an in sti tu tional sit u a tion
that seemed to pro mote po lit i cal and socio-eco nomic re forms nec es sary
for es tab lish ment of de moc racy and a mar ket econ omy. How ever, the
ma jor ity of pow er ful bu reau cracy and or di nary peo ple were not in ter es -
ted in cru cial ref or ma tions of the ex isted so cial or der, even though they
de clared their sup port of cru cial changes in the so cial sys tem and deep -
en ing of mar ket re forms. Peo ple were dis sat is fied with most com po nents 
of the so cial sys tem, apart from the en sured em ploy ment and pos si bil ity
of ver ti cal mo bil ity for those orig i nated from the work ing class and peas -
ants. Of course to en sure this, the coun try needed to cre ate enor mous
and struc tur ally un bal anced work ing places and pres ti gious so cial po -
si tions. Con trary to cap i tal ism reg u larly suf fer ing from over-pro duc tion
of com mod i ties and ser vices, so cial ism over-pro duces pro duc ers and
con sum ers with the cor re spond ingly dis torted socio-class and socio-
 pro fes sional struc tures. There was no other coun try in the world hav ing
so many doc tors and teach ers as was the case in the  USSR (and also in
Ukraine). Be fore the USSR col lapse, the same could be said about al -
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most all socio-pro fes sional po si tions of higher qual i fi ca tions. Had the
new power re formed the socio-pro fes sional struc ture by mak ing it a sac -
ri fice to the mar ket econ omy, mil lions of peo ple of high qual i fi ca tions
would have be come un nec es sary in the new struc ture. A sim i lar sit u a -
tion was in the socio-class struc ture: ex ten sive de vel op ment of ma te rial
pro duc tion (along with ideo log i cal ori en ta tion to sup port of the van -
guard of  so viet so ci ety) led to over-pro duc tion of the van guard of the
work ing class (in dus trial work ers) in the USSR and Ukraine. 
As a re sult, we got a spe cific Ukrai nian model of post-com mu nist de -
vel op ment which sig nif i cantly dif fers from the Bal tic, Rus sian, Cau ca -
sian and Mid dle Asian mod els. At that time, among all for mer re pub lics
of the USSR, only Belarus and Kazakhstan were close to Ukraine, al -
though their ev i dent in cli na tion for Rus sia and ab sence of the cou pon
hy per-in fla tion ex cluded them from sup port ers of the fol low ing so cial
sur vival: a so cial ist so ci ety with out any com mu nist ide ol ogy, with a reg -
u lated State econ omy and spon ta ne ously form ing mar ket re la tions. On
the scale “closed so ci ety — open so ci ety”, the place of Ukraine was like
a “half-open so ci ety” with sig nif i cantly ad vance open ness to po lit i cal
 liber ties and absolutely insignificant achievements in the economy. 
It is only nat u ral that such a po lit i cal and eco nomic cen taur could not 
be sus tain able. The world ex pe ri ence of so cial or ga ni za tion does not
pos sess any sus tain able ex am ples of po lit i cal free dom ex ist ing in eco -
nomic ar bi trari ness. How ever, the Ukrai nian model of post-com mu nist
de vel op ment ap peared and is worth an a lyz ing.  First of all, this hap -
pened be cause it sur vived un der very hard so cial and eco nomic con di -
tions, and sec ondly, it may help to solve so cial con flicts that of ten be -
come aggressive and bloody in transforming societies. 
The Ukrai nian ver sion of  an “eco nomic mir a cle”, when the level of life
for the ma jor ity of the pop u la tion dropped to com plete pov erty, can be of
sig nif i cant the o ret i cal in ter est for fu ture his to ri ans and econ o mists who 
will be study ing de vel op ment of post-com mu nist world af ter the col lapse 
of the USSR. At the first stage of post-com mu nist trans for ma tion, the
Ukrai nian model was ab so lutely in ef fi cient, apart from its abil ity to
main tain peace in the coun try with out open home ag gres sion and blood -
shed. It was the rea son why L.Kravchuk, the Pres i dent of Ukraine, con -
sid ered his home pol icy suc cess ful, and the suc cess had to be a vote for
the con ser va tive and guard ing strat egy which was  cho sen by the power
in the socio-eco nomic shock ing con di tions sim i lar for all post-com mu -
nist coun tries. Any way, as to the home sit u a tion, Ukraine hap pened to
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be one of few for mer so viet re pub lics that man aged to avoid un com pro -
mis ing confrontation of political forces and bloody conflicts. 
It could be that Ukraine gained ex pe ri ence of peace ful tran si tion from 
com mu nist dic ta tor ship and a plan-ad min is tra tive econ omy to an open
dem o cratic so ci ety and that ex pe ri ence is of ex clu sive his tor i cal value,
worth re pro duc tion in other coun tries giv ing up their com mu nist past. It 
could be that the price for the  “ab sence of con flicts” at the be gin ning of
in de pend ence — we mean de stroyed econ omy and mass an o mie — is not
so high to deny the de vel op ment strat egy that en sured “the bad peace be -
ing better than a good war”. 
The es sence of the Ukrai nian model was de ter mined by the power
striv ing for so cial bal ance with the help of min i mal so cial changes and
pres er va tion of old struc tures and mech a nisms for so cial con trol in or -
der to avoid any es sen tial rise in a so cially un claimed layer be ing the in -
ev i ta ble con se quence of rad i cal de struc tion in so cial grounds. When the
model is put into life, the re sult is an ab sence of large-scale vi o lent con -
flicts on the one hand and de cline of the econ omy and socio-po lit i cal ac -
tiv ity on the other hand. To get the mass sup port of that strat egy in the
so ci ety, they im planted a to tal fear of any con flicts in clud ing the con flict,
nec es sary for dem o cratic de vel op ment, be tween old to tal i tar ian man -
age ment and a civil so ci ety. As a re sult, the peo ple’s fear of con struc tive
so cial con flicts be came a mech a nism re strain ing all constructive
actions meant to overcome social and economic problems. 
Be ing afraid of pos si ble so cial chaos when rad i cal so cial changes
take place, the ma jor ity of peo ple sup ported the same po lit i cal idea as
the power — they de clared their sup port of so ci ety de moc ra ti za tion,
mar ket re forms and con struc tion of a le gal State — but they did not do
any thing to meet those po lit i cal goals.  They did not trust in pol i ti cians
but they did not in sist on mak ing pol i ti cians’ ef forts more ac tive in con -
struc tion of a dem o cratic coun try with an ef fec tive mar ket econ omy.
Namely that fear —  com mon for the gov ern ing elite afraid of los ing the
con trol to which they ac cus tomed and the “si lent ma jor ity” clutch ing at
the elite be cause they con sider it (due to its rul ing and di rect ing im age
root ing from the good old times) a pledge of “bad peace” — be came the
main source of eco nomic degradation and the discredited idea of the
State’s independence. 
Talk ing about the Ukrai nian model ap peared at the be gin ning of
post-com mu nist trans for ma tions, we have to take into ac count the spe -
cial sys tem of inter-elite re la tions es tab lished in Ukraine as a re sult of
post-com mu nist dif fer en ti a tion in po lit i cal elites. Un der cer tain con di -
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tions, they could act as a po lit i cal force sta bi liz ing a so cial sit u a tion or
they could ini ti ate an or ga nized so cial pro test. Spe cific char ac ter of so -
cial and po lit i cal or ga ni za tion of so ci ety de ter mines the spe cific fea tures
of the elites’ ex is tence, ways of their in ter re la tions and zones of con sent
and con flicts. There is a gen eral law: the tough ness of gov ern men tal con -
trol over so cial be hav ior in main so cial spheres — eco nomic, po lit i cal,
so cial and cul tural — is di rectly con nected to the ex tent of in ner and
outer dif fer en ti a tion in cor re spond ing elites. It means that the most in te -
grated ones are the elites of so ci et ies with a sin gle to tal i tar ian ide ol ogy
and a mighty re pres sive ma chine. They ex clude any pos si bil ity of po lit i -
cal op po si tion as a main source of inter-elite con flicts. The spe cial “ab -
sence of con flicts” be longs to com mu nist coun tries toughly con trol ling
not only pol i tics and ide ol ogy but also the econ omy. Un der “non-com mu -
nist to tal i tar i an ism”, mar ket re la tions, pri vate prop erty and com pe ti -
tion are able to ex ist and this in ev i ta bly leads to differentiation in eco -
nomic elites and inter-elite conflicts. Power of communists makes it
possible to maintain the “elite monolith” for a long time.
At the be gin ning of post-com mu nist trans for ma tions, the sit u a tion
seemed to change rad i cally due to dif fer en ti a tion in so cial ist no men cla -
ture and ap pear ance of new po lit i cal, eco nomic and in tel lec tual elites
born by the col lapse of com mu nist ide ol ogy and in de pend ent de vel op -
ment of Ukraine. Namely the con flict be tween new and old elites ini ti ates 
a so cial burst in a post-to tal i tar ian so ci ety: in crit i cal pe ri ods, op po si -
tion be tween elites and the mass (apart from sep a rate spon ta ne ous ac -
tions easy to be sup pressed by united elites) can be come rev o lu tion ary in 
char ac ter with mas sive blood shed and a civil war only if the pow er ful
elite’s in ter ests are in com pat i ble with in ter ests of op po site po lit i cal for -
ces. De spite the fact that, in Ukraine, the dif fer en ti a tion in elites led to
the ev i dent ideo log i cal fight be tween the “party of power” and the op po si -
tion, an all em brac ing mass dis sat is fac tion with the power and dis trust
in their abil i ties to over come the cri sis,  they were not an ac tive enough
and or ga nized force to turn the long evo lu tion ary pro cess (when an old
so cial sys tem has to die off) into a rev o lu tion ary burst with the help of the 
mass distrust in the power structures and dissatisfaction with eco no -
mic situation in the country. 
Doz ens of le gally reg is tered po lit i cal par ties de clar ing their op po si -
tion to the pow er ful elite could not be come a real op po si tion to the power
pro duc ing the phe nom e non (typ i cal for the de vel oped so cial ism) of om -
ni pres ent “party of power”. The only dif fer ence be tween it and the CPSU
was an ab sence of ev i dent ideo log i cal doc trine im pos si ble to be re vised.
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Both of them had the same es sence: to be in charge of main con trol le vers 
in the State and kol khoz econ omy and de vel op ment of laws to con trol
dis tri bu tion of prop erty. The “party of power” eas ily sac ri ficed some ideo -
log i cal dog mas and po lit i cal fig ures in or der to con serve the closed sys -
tem for con trol over so cial and eco nomic re la tions: ex ec u tors could be
changed, but the mech a nisms, per fected by de cades of eco nomic sup -
pres sion, — never. All the ef forts for mak ing the sys tem func tion ing as a
so cial pro tec tor of peo ple were un char ac ter is tic and there fore turned
into the farce that made the ma jor ity of the peo ple poor and need ing gov -
ern men tal care. So, they re pro duced the phe nom e non of “a party and
peo ple be ing united” when the “party” reg u larly takes care to make more
peo ple poor in so ci ety and the poor clung to the “party” be cause they are
afraid of los ing achieve ments of so cial ism; but some how they started to
see that their hands voting for preservation of old order in the economy
may look like hands asking for the dole. 
So, de spite the fact that in Ukraine dif fer en ti a tion in elites caused en -
mity be tween the “party of power” and op po si tion, there was not an ac tive 
and or ga nized enough force able to turn the long evo lu tion ary pro cess
(when the old so cial sys tem has to die off) into a rev o lu tion ary burst with
the help of the mass dis trust in the power struc tures and dis sat is fac tion
with the eco nomic sit u a tion in the coun try. It hap pened be cause the
elites di vided zones of in flu ence be tween them selves: econ omy be longed
to the old no men cla ture elite, while ide ol ogy was passed to the most or -
ga nized new one formed on the basis of strengthening the na tio nal State.
The neo-no men cla ture and na tional-dem o cratic elites formed a
strong “cen trist buffer” that de terred any so cial burst. The right na tion -
al ist and left com mu nist move ments al le vi ated any ex trem ist ex plo sive
dan ger due to their un com pro mis ing strug gle (con trary to Rus sia, where 
na tional chau vin ists and com mu nists jointly pro voked putsch and
mass dis tur bances). As a re sult, nei ther these nor those could have got -
ten the de ci sive sup port of lumpenized and marginalized lay ers be ing the 
main destructive force in social protests. 
Es tab lish ment of Dou ble Institutional Sys tem:
1994–1998 
De spite all po lit i cal re forms and eco nomic ex per i ments of new power,
the first years of Ukrai nian in de pend ence did not bring in so ci ety new
 institutes with le gal sta tus and ac tive in sti tu tional in fra struc ture. In
those con di tions, there were more and more ev i dence of the So viet in sti -
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tu tional sys tem be ing re-legitimized: State pa ter nal ism, com mu nist
par ty, pseudo-pri va tised (look ing like joint-stock) en ter prises and so on.
Many old so cial in sti tu tions started work ing again un der new so cial
con di tions. They did not die off, in stead they re-in car nated. The so cial
struc ture of post-So viet so ci ety pre served many sta tus and role po si -
tions for so cial ac tors, sim i lar to those oc cu pied by them in the past. For
ex am ple, in the new gov ern men tal struc tures, the old no men cla ture
survived practically without any material, social, status and moral
losses. 
Al though the Ukrai nian gov ern ment stressed their ad her ence to
west ern ide ol ogy and in ten tion to in te grate with the West, the formed
“State-cen taur” (with a head turned to the West, but un able to go there
be cause its ba sis was stuck in so cial ism) was a “tran si tion so ci ety” with
more and more un iden ti fied sta tus as to the dem o cratic and mar ket per -
spec tive. When the mass dis ap point ment with mir a cles of dem o cratic
dec la ra tions in ten si fied nos tal gia for the lost “so cial or der”, the “so cial
or gan ism”, pushed into dif fer ent po lit i cal and eco nomic di rec tions, start -
ed to de velop in the di rec tion op po site to what was pre vi ously de clared. 
In this con text, the most im por tant char ac ter is tics of the ini tial stage
of post-So viet trans for ma tions and the stage that fol lowed the first two
years of in sti tu tional changes were the following:
1991 – be gin ning of 1992 1994–1998
Ori en ta tion to the mar ket mech a -
nisms for con trol over econ omy
Ori en ta tion to the gov ern men tal sup -
port of in dus try 
Mass sup port of the State in de pend -
ence Pre vail ing sup port of re-in te gra tion
Com mu nist party loses the mass
sup port
Com mu nist party is the main op po si -
tion force and a pre tender for power 
Com mu nist re gime is re spon si ble
for de pres sion in the coun try 
The power dem o crat i cally elected is
re spon si ble for what is hap pen ing
Those changes be came pos si ble due to sig nif i cant evo lu tion of the
mass con scious ness, in which dis so ci a tion from the mul ti party in sti -
tute grew and po si tions of those, who were against pri vate prop erty on
land and en ter prises, strength ened. It seems that for a cou ple of years of
free life, the es tab lished layer of pro pri etors and the mighty splash in pri -
vate eco nomic ini tia tives had to pro mote the grad ual death of com mu -
nist hab its and moods among the ma jor ity of the pop u la tion. How ever,
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nei ther this fac tor nor dem o crats with a young gen er a tion, in fected with
com mu nist ori en ta tions to the least ex tent, led to an ex ten sion the in flu -
ence of dem o cratic val ues. The ghost of com mu nism be came real and got 
se ri ous power am bi tions. 
At the same time, Ukrai nian so ci ety man aged to avoid the sec ond
com ing of the com mu nist mes siah and ag gres sive so cial con flicts. We
think it could be ex plained by the con cept of  the “in sti tu tional hy -
per-full-value” paradox: 
1. On the one hand, the So viet in sti tutes that formed the sys tem did
not lose their tra di tional le git i macy to gether with los ing their le gal char -
ac ter as a re sult of Peres troika and the USSR col lapse. Peo ple agreed
with so cial rules based on the State pa ter nal ism ide ol ogy, pres er va tion
of the State prop erty on big en ter prises, so cial ist priv i leges for the pop u -
la tion and priv i leges for the pow er ful elites, pres er va tion of the State
dom i nance in ed u ca tion, health care, sci ence, art cul ture and  con trol
over con fes sional and interethnic re la tions. 
2. On the other hand, il le gal (shadow) so viet in sti tutes (the shadow
pro duc tion and prof i teer ing from com mod ity de fi ciency, pro tec tion and
cor rup tion, or ga nized crime, dou ble moral stan dards for the pub lic and
pri vate moral po si tions) trans formed into the le gal in sti tutes of “trans -
form ing so ci ety”, but did not gain the nec es sary le git i macy be cause peo -
ple per ceived  them as “le gal il le gal ity”. That is why peo ple did not want to
fol low the rules of le gal for mally but shadow in es sence and ac cept new
in sti tu tions as a basic institutional infrastructure of society. 
Be ing anomically de mor al ized and  feel ing dis trust and dis sat is fac -
tion with their po si tions in the so ci ety, most Ukrai ni ans were am biv a lent 
to the in sti tu tional for ma tions, le gal ity or le git i macy of which were not
en sured by laws or moral norms. Such am biv a lence man i fested it self in
the mass con sent to live in the in sti tu tional space, where le gal ity is en -
sured by the only fact of le gal ex is tence of new in sti tu tions and le git i -
macy is en sured by pres er va tion of old in sti tutes with the same tra di -
tional reg u la tive func tions and based on the pre served el e ments of so cial 
in fra struc ture, old so cial po si tions and role in struc tions. The de scribed
as pects formed the “in sti tu tional hy per-full-value” of Ukrai nian so ci ety
based on peo ple’s con sent to live in the in sti tu tional space, where old
and new in sti tutes en sure, with all their con tra dic tory ex is tence, all at -
trib utes of institutionalism nec es sary for so cial in te gra tion and sta bil -
ity. A clas sic ex am ple of in sti tu tional du al ity is ac tiv ity of peo ple’s dep u -
ties of Ukraine: most of them ac tively par tic i pate in en tre pre neur ship,
be cause the power and com mer cial in sti tu tions formed the “sym bi otic
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relationship” (the term by R.Inglehart ). Sim i lar ties con nect prac ti cally
all in sti tu tional for ma tions, so, in all in sti tu tional sec tors, Ukrainian
citizens can get double institutional pressure and find those attributes
of legality and legitimacy necessary for social consent. 
 The par al lel ex is tence of two so cial struc tures sup ported a new so cial 
or der, in which the most ac tive new so cial ac tors did not tend to de -
stabilization of so ci ety (be ing afraid of com mu nist res to ra tion), while
rep re sen ta tives of the mass old lay ers tried, with the help of the dou ble
institutionalization, pre serve, at least par tially, their usual so cial roles
and po si tions. As a re sult, al most all so ci ety was happy about the so cial
sit u a tion: old and new so cial in sti tu tions co-ex isted due to con tra dic -
tory in flu ence of le gal ity and legitimacy in the current social order. 
Es tab lish ment of that in sti tu tional sys tem was ac com pa nied by es -
sen tial wors en ing of eco nomic sit u a tion in the coun try — GNP dropped,
un em ploy ment grew, the level of life fell, and so there was a rise in pes si -
mis tic moods, dis sat is fac tion with life, un cer tainty in the fu ture and dis -
trust in the power struc tures. How ever, there was some so cial sta bil ity
that made it pos si ble for the power struc tures to carry out a num ber of
po lit i cal and eco nomic re forms, very im por tant for the fur ther so lu tion
of so cial and eco nomic prob lems: the Con sti tu tion was adopted, the
mon e tary re form and mass pri vat iza tion were put into life. As a re sult of
the lat ter, in 1998, most en ter prises be came pri vate prop erty and mainly
be cause of that, by L.Kuchma’s sec ond Pres i den tial term, the ba sis for
eco nomic rise was formed. The rise was nec es sary for the busi ness class
that ini tially grew on pseudo-op er a tions or op er a tions con ducted out -
side the mar ket — we mean trust and cur rency frauds, barter and rents
based on State subsidies or priority rights for natural resources use. 
New In sti tu tional Cri sis and Or ange Rev o lu tion
(1999–2004)
Ten years of L.Kuchma’s Pres i dency cre ated the fol low ing par a dox:
the eco nomic fail ure of 1994–1999 was ac com pa nied by po lit i cal sta bil -
ity while his sec ond Pres i den tial term, eco nom i cally suc cess ful, was
char ac ter ized by stormy po lit i cal dis tur bances and found its in fa mous
end with the 12% rise in GNP (there was no higher  achieve ment in the
post-com mu nist world). The end was par tially re lated to the cas sette
scan dal and badly cho sen suc ces sor at the elec tion of 2004. How ever,
those events (which played a role to trig ger the anti-Kuchmism man i fes -
ta tion) had deeper rea sons. The in sti tu tional sys tem, formed in pre vi ous 
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years, found it self in con tra dic tion with the needs of most of the ac tive
lay ers of the pop u la tion and needs of the in flu en tial oppositional po lit i -
cal elites, who did not find (or lose) their place in the power hi er ar chy. The 
first re bel lion of the elites against Pres i dent L.Kuchma in 2001 was not
suc cess ful be cause re sources of the dou ble in sti tu tional sys tem were
not ex hausted and, for most peo ple, main tain ing the sta ble sit u a tion
was more im por tant than to dis miss L.Kuchma.  The first signs of the
peo ple’s ad ap ta tion to new so cial con di tions ap peared only in 1999,
while any growth of real in comes had was not  seen un til 2001 — al -
though the macro-eco nomic sit u a tion started to im prove. Un der those
con di tions, the so ci ety was still more caring about its basic economic
survival than about political fights between the power and oppositional
elites.  
By 2004, the sit u a tion changed. The level of life and so cial well-be ing
rose es sen tially. The ev ery day and ex haust ing fight for sur vival stepped
back, and many Ukrai ni ans turned to po lit i cal col li sions re lated to the
end of L.Kuchma’s ep och and the ne ces sity to choose his suc ces sor.
How ever, the dou ble in sti tu tional sys tem failed. Mak ing a choice of stra -
te gic course for the coun try and so ci ety, it could pro pose only am biv a lent 
de ci sions by pro vid ing con trary de vel op ment directions with legality
and legitimacy. 
Dou ble institutionalization is a tem po rary phe nom e non pre vent ing
dem o cratic trans for ma tion of so ci ety. It over loads the in sti tu tional spa -
ce with roles, norms and in fra struc tures and re pro duces the feel ing of
so cial help less ness and dis sat is fac tion with so cial po si tion among the
ma jor ity of peo ple. This dis sat is fac tion opens a door to sim ple and clear
slo gans sug gested by the po lit i cal op po si tion, like “Ban dits will be put
into prison!”, “Power has to be sep a rated from busi ness!” and so on. Sim -
plic ity of those slo gans was an ad van ta geous con trast to the power
multi-di rec tion char ac ter that of ten ex cused du plic ity and un cer tainty
of po lit i cal and moral po si tions. The multi-di rec tion po si tion has an ad -
van tage: there is no need to make a de ci sive choice be tween West and
East, busi ness and pol i tics, jus tice and cor rup tion. Thus, re sources of
the dou ble in sti tu tional sys tem (pos si bly to avoid choos ing be tween the
old and new in the institutional space) happened to be unclaimed in the
presidential campaign of 2004. 
The Or ange Rev o lu tion de stroyed the ad min is tra tive sce nario of  pre -
sidential elec tion in Ukraine in 2004 along with most ten den cies in the
de vel op ment of the mass con scious ness. Some ten den cies changed
their di rec tions, oth ers rad i cally in ten si fied. Such sig nif i cant changes
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that oc curred in the mass con scious ness with the help of rev o lu tion ary
events of the Pres i den tial elec tion made it pos si ble to con clude that the
dem o cratic de vel op ment in Ukraine came to a turn ing point. The mon i -
tor ing sur vey of the be gin ning of 2005 re vealed (for the first time) a rise in
de moc ra ti za tion of the mass con scious ness ac cord ing to a num ber of in -
di ces start ing from the po lit i cal, moral and psy cho log i cal sphere. How -
ever, the re sults of the sur vey con ducted just af ter the par lia men tary
elec tion of April 2006 con vinc ingly showed that peo ple’s ori en ta tions
and moods about dem o cratic prin ci ples re turned to the po si tions of the
be gin ning of 2004. As a re sult, the sig nif i cant im prove ment in a num ber
of in di ces was noth ing more than tem po rary splashes of dem o cratic
moods. 
In the be gin ning of 2005, the most sig nif i cant rise in the moods was
reg is tered by the fol low ing in di ces: trust in the Pres i dent, gov ern ment,
rep re sen ta tive power; trust in the mul ti party sys tem in sti tute, par ties
and party lead ers; re al iza tion of own po lit i cal ef fi ciency (con fi dence in
the fact that or di nary peo ple can in flu ence po lit i cal pro cesses in the
coun try); and so cial op ti mism (ex pec ta tions and con fi dence in the fact
that the sit u a tion will im prove in the coun try). How ever, the rev o lu tion -
ary ex pec ta tions, hopes and il lu sions were ru ined by the post-rev o lu -
tion ary re al ity that brought the stagnation tendencies and recurrent
moods back into Ukrainian society. 
Af ter the Rev o lu tion… a Year Later
The so cial trans for ma tion stage that fol lowed the stormy events of Or -
ange Rev o lu tion is far from its end. Its role in the dem o cratic de vel op -
ment of Ukrai nian so ci ety is wait ing to be an a lyzed. How ever, we have got
the re sults of mon i tor ing sur veys, which make it pos si ble to eval u ate
how the Or ange Rev o lu tion and its con se quences have in flu enced the
mass con scious ness, opin ions, so cial eval u a tions and moods of Ukrai -
ni ans. The re sults of those sur veys have not been pub lished yet, so we in -
tro duce not only our con clu sions but also the em pir i cal data be ing the
ba sis for the con clu sions. 
In 2005, a rev o lu tion ary splash in so cial op ti mism led to the fact that
the num ber of op ti mists dou bled the num ber of pes si mists for the first
time dur ing Ukrai nian in de pend ence. A year passed and dom i na tion of
so cial pes si mism prac ti cally re turned to the previous level. 
That year changed rad i cally peo ple’s moods about the fu ture of Uk -
raine. The dy nam ics of so cial moods is char ac ter ized by a sig nif i cant
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rise in a group of those who ex pressed neg a tive moods and a fall in a
group of those who have pos i tive feel ings about the fu ture of Ukraine. For 
ex am ple, the share of those who think about the Ukrai nian fu ture and
feel op ti mism, in ter est, con fi dence, joy and sat is fac tion de creased, while 
the share of those who mostly feel anx i ety, con fu sion, help less ness, fear,
pes si mism grew es sen tially. Op ti mism was dom i nant by the be gin ning of 
2005, and anx i ety was dom i nant by the be gin ning of 2006. The growth in 
pes si mis tic moods was ac com pa nied by a fall in op ti mis tic prog no ses
and ex pec ta tions about development of various social spheres in
Ukraine. 
Un for tu nately, in Ukraine, so cial and po lit i cal pro cesses were dis -
turbed by the mas sive splash in peo ple’s trust in the power struc tures
and cer tain po lit i cal lead ers that ap peared dur ing the first months af ter
the rev o lu tion. This re lates mostly to dis ap point ment with the Pres i dent: 
a year later, the level of trust in the Pres i dent fell by 20%. Along with the
fall in trust in the Pres i dent, there was a fall in eval u a tions of his ac tiv ity.
Since 1998, the mon i tor ing has in cluded ques tions about eval u a tion of
pres i den tial ac tiv ity in Ukraine, Rus sia, Belarus and USA (the scale of
10 points). For the whole pe riod, the high est eval u a tion be longed to
B.Clinton, US Pres i dent (1998–2001). In 2001, it reached 7.7 points. Af -
ter G.Bush came to power, the eval u a tion of the US Pres i dent’s ac tiv ity
dropped. In 2004, the G.Bush’s rat ing was 4.5 points. Thus, this rat ing
was higher than the points given by Ukrai ni ans to their Pres i dent,
L.Kuch ma (3.2 points). Rus sian Pres i dent, B.Yeltsin (1998–2000), was
the only to reach L.Kuchma as to un pop u lar ity. Af ter V.Putin came to
power, the Rus sian Pres i dent’s rat ing rose sig nif i cantly in Ukraine.
V.Yushchenko’s com ing to power brought an es sen tial rise in pop u lar ity
of Ukrai nian Pres i dent (5.6 points). In March 2005, V.Yushchenko al -
most reached V.Putin (6.0 points) and A.Lukashenko (5.8 points), and
was ahead of G.Bush (5.0 points). How ever, by the be gin ning of 2006, the 
rat ing of Ukrai nian Pres i dent hap pened to be the low est (3.8 points),
while the ratings of V.Putin and A.Lukashenko became even higher and
reach ed the same 6.3 points. 
In 2005, along with the fall in trust in the Pres i dent, a share of those
who trusted in other power struc tures, like the gov ern ment or Verkhov -
na Rada, de creased as well, and so the cur rent at ti tudes to ward the  re -
presentative and ex ec u tive power are char ac ter ized by dom i nant dis -
trust as it was pre vi ously (be fore the Or ange Rev o lu tion). A splash in
pos i tive at ti tudes to the mul ti party in sti tu tion which was reg is tered
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right af ter the rev o lu tion changed in a course of a year to a rise in neg a -
tive orientations and a drop in positive ones. 
Such changes in dem o cratic ori en ta tions are mostly re lated to dis sat -
is fac tion with lead ers of the Or ange Rev o lu tion. The peo ple who men -
tioned that they lack “lead ers ca pa ble of gov ern ing the State” in creased
by 15%. An swer ing the ques tion: “Did You sup port po lit i cal lead ers of
the Or ange Rev o lu tion and Do You sup port them now?”, 15% of re spon -
dents said that they “sup ported them but do not sup port now”. Some
peo ple clearly re al ize this change in their ori en ta tions, oth ers eas ily
jumped to new opin ions with the help of “com plai sant” mem ory. In the
be gin ning of 2005, 27% of pop u la tion an swered “did not sup port and do
not sup port now”, and in the be gin ning of 2006, al ready 39% did not
sup port and do not sup port now. Only a year later, a share of those who
think that they failed as a re sult of Or ange Rev o lu tion tri pled, while a
share of those who think that they gained halved. The neg a tive dy nam ics 
was reg is tered in an swers to the ques tion: “How will the re sults of pre s i -
den tial election influence the well-being of your family in 5 years?”
Only one year was spent by the in com pe tent po lit i cal man age ment to
put an end to pos i tive changes in Ukrai nian de moc ra ti za tion, so we re -
turned to the ini tial level at the be gin ning of 2004. At the same time, neg -
a tive ten den cies (like grow ing anti-mar ket ori en ta tions, weak en ing geo -
political ori en ta tions to the West, etc.), reg is tered in all years of Ukrai -
nian in de pend ence, have intensified noticeably. 
From March 2004 to March 2005, es sen tial changes were re vealed in
eco nomic eval u a tions, ori en ta tions and po si tions of Ukrai ni ans: a steep
rise in the anti-mar ket moods and neg a tive at ti tudes to pri vat iza tion of
land, small and es pe cially large en ter prises. Less peo ple want to open
their own busi ness (an en ter prise, a farm and etc.) or work for a pri vate
owner. In 2005, due to the “anti-oli garch” rhet o ric, the anti-pri vat iza tion
moods rose even higher. By the be gin ning of 2006, a part of the peo ple
with neg a tive at ti tudes to pri vat iza tion of large en ter prises reached 67%. 
In the sur vey of 1992 con ducted just af ter Ukraine de clared its in de -
pend ence, such peo ple made up ap prox i mately 32%. There was reg is -
tered an es sen tial growth in neg a tive at ti tudes to pri vat iza tion of land
also. In 1992, 14% and 64% had neg a tive and pos i tive at ti tudes cor re -
spond ingly; in 2006, the cor re spond ing fig ures were 53% and 24%. The
highest jumps in the privatization negativism were in two recent years. 
The rev o lu tion ary and post-rev o lu tion ary pe ri ods not only led to
anti- mar ket moods, but also strength ened ori en ta tions of the mass con -
scious ness to the East ern geopolitical di rec tion in the in ter na tional con -
20 Ukrai nian So cio log i cal Re view, 2006–2007
Yevgen Golovakha, Natalia Panina
sol i da tion of Ukraine. There was a steep rise in neg a tive at ti tudes to en -
ter ing NATO. To tell the truth, a growth in neg a tive ori en ta tions had been
reg is tered for the whole pe riod of the mon i tor ing sur vey. In the be gin ning
of 2005, just af ter the Or ange Rev o lu tion, a num ber of those who were
against NATO jumped (ow ing to some part of those who were neu tral or
even sup ported NATO be fore) and made up over a half of the pop u la tion.
By the be gin ning of 2006, the part of those who were against join ing
NATO in creased by 14% (!) and reached 64%, while the part of those who
sup ported the idea dropped to 13%. In 2005, 54% of Ukrai ni ans ex -
pressed their pos i tive at ti tudes to the “idea of join ing the union of Russia
and Belarus” (28% were against of the idea).
De spite the spread of the pos i tive ori en ta tions to ward the East ern-
 Slavic un ion in 2005,  part of its sup port ers de creased (in com par i son to
the data of 2004, when 63% ex pressed their pos i tive at ti tudes and 20%
were against of it) but in 2006 the num ber of sup port ers rose again and
reached 61%. The mass con scious ness ex presses cer tain am bi gu ity, be -
cause it ap proves (along with the East ern ori en ta tion) the pos si bil ity of
Ukraine join ing the EU: in 2006, the idea was sup ported by 61% of the
pop u la tion. How ever, the part of those who are against it grew es sen -
tially — from 12% in 2004 to 25% in 2006. As a whole, about 20% of the
pop u la tion can be char ac ter ized by geopolitical am biv a lence: they sup -
port the idea of Ukrai nian en ter ing both un ions — the Eastern and the
Western ones.  
Some times the geopolitical ori en ta tions of Ukrai ni ans are in op po si -
tion to their elec toral choices. Anal y sis of the sup port of  cer tain po lit i cal
forces in elec toral cam paigns of ten re veal a gap be tween peo ple’s per -
sonal po lit i cal po si tions and pro grams of the po lit i cal forces they vote for. 
For ex am ple, those who sup ported the un ion with Rus sia made up 36%
of vot ers for V.Yushchenko in the third round of the pres i den tial elec tion
in 2004 and 36% of vot ers for “Our Ukraine” at the par lia men tary elec -
tion of 2006. Also among vot ers for the BYuT and So cial ist Party at the
par lia men tary elec tion of 2006, there were 31% and 57% of those who
sup ported the idea of en ter ing the un ion of Rus sia and Belarus
 correspon dingly. Among the vot ers for V.Yushchenko in the third round
of the pres i den tial elec tion in 2004 and for “Our Ukraine” at the par lia -
men tary elec tion of 2006, there were 43% and 40% of those who were
against en ter ing NATO cor re spond ingly. The per cent age of such peo ple
among vot ers for the BYuT and So cial ist Party at the par lia men tary elec -
tion of 2006 made 42% and 61% cor re spond ingly.
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Peo ple ex plain those changes in their moods mostly by dis ap point -
ment with lead ers of the Or ange Rev o lu tion. Thus, to our mind, such
meta mor pho ses in the mass con scious ness can be ex plained by both
ob jec tive re sults of cer tain pol i ti cians’ ac tiv ity and the fact that, in the
first post-rev o lu tion ary months, the clearly ex pressed op ti mism was
mostly of a  “par a sit i cal” na ture. It was ac com pa nied by an “un be liev -
able” (for so cio log i cal mon i tor ing) splash in trust in new po lit i cal lead -
ers, and first of all in the newly elected Pres i dent of Ukraine. How ever, to -
gether with that enor mous credit of trust, the pub lic con scious ness
passed to the new power the full re spon si bil ity of  fur ther de vel op ment in
the coun try and peo ple’s well-be ing. Apart from par tic i pa tion in the rev o -
lu tion ary events, the level of po lit i cal and civil ac tiv ity of the pop u la tion
was tra di tion ally low. Hav ing not gained all the ex pected in a trice, peo ple 
felt deeply dis ap pointed with the new power. At first sight, it seems un fair 
be cause, even ac cord ing to self-re ports of re spon dents, their wages
(pen sions, schol ar ships) rose by 45% on av er age, and in come per per son 
grew by 31%. At the same time, al most two fifths of the pop u la tion (39%)
men tioned that the ma te rial con di tions of their fam i lies had wors ened
for the past year, the part of those whose ma te rial con di tions im proved
made up only 14%; while a year ago, the lat ter fig ure was 20%. The part of 
those who think that they “can not tol er ate such a di sas trous con di tion
any more” in creased from 21% to 29%. We have to say that those moods
were ex pressed un der con di tions when in di ces of ma te rial well-be ing
(like a num ber of mo bile con nec tion sub scrib ers that has dou bled for
the past year) rose and the so cial well-be ing im proved. 
An a lyz ing the rea sons why the dem o cratic shoots fade in the mass
con scious ness, we may ex plain it by dis ap point ment with the Or ange
Rev o lu tion lead ers who, fight ing with each other, make rash po lit i cal
dec la ra tions and in com pe tent de ci sions — re sults of sur veys seem to
sup port this idea. How ever, to our mind, the roots of such mass moods
are deeper and can lead to neg a tive con se quences for the dem o cratic
 deve lopment of Ukraine. 
Since Ukraine de clared its in de pend ence, the pop u la tion have to live
in so cial an o mie char ac ter ized by ab sence of the value-nor ma tive ba sis
for so cial con sol i da tion in so ci ety, and this con sol i da tion is im pos si ble
with out com mon un der stand ing of “what is wrong and what is right”,
what is en cour aged and what is pun ished in this so ci ety. The old value-
 nor ma tive sys tem that con sol i dated a to tal i tar ian so ci ety has been de -
stroyed, and a new one based on dem o cratic val ues has not been es tab -
lished yet. In these con di tions, over 80% of Ukrai ni ans were led to high
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an omic de mor al iza tion. How ever, an o mie can not last for ever, and so the
mass con scious ness looks for val ues in the past and tries to find a mes -
siah ca pa ble of re stor ing or der in the coun try. In an an omic so ci ety, such
a mes siah could be come an au thor i tar ian leader of a fas cist kind or a
 totalitarian leader with com mu nist rhet o ric or an ar chaic-tra di tional
“spirit pas tor”. In Ukraine, the wounds in flicted by fas cist and com mu -
nist lead ers are fresh enough. Find ing no act ing dem o cratic val ues or
even ba sic laws in so ci ety, the mass con scious ness ap peals to the tra di -
tional value base for reg u la tion of so cial re la tions. In tu ition prompted to
the new po lit i cal force that came in the power the rhet o ric and at trib utes
cor re spond ing to the val ues, which gain an im age of moral and con sol i -
dat ing ba sis in so ci ety. As a re sult, we ob tained the tra di tion al ist ori en -
ta tion, rather strange for po lit i cal lead ers de clar ing a way to in te gra tion
in a mod ern dem o cratic so ci ety: ar chaic dresses and hair styles, pub lic
wor ships at the high est gov ern men tal level, attempts to introduce re li -
gious doctrines in the state educational system and nepotism as a main
principle to choose personnel for the power struc tures, etc.  
Un for tu nately, those who crit i cize this be hav ior and pol i ti cians who
un der es ti mate the fact that ar chaic at trib utes and so cial be hav ior of
new power cor re spond to the choice of the Ukrai nian pop u la tion (de ter -
mined by a long pe riod of an o mie and il le gal ity): they chose the tra di tion -
al ist model of con sol i da tion and society development. 
The Or ange Rev o lu tion that man i fested it self as dem o cratic hap -
pened to be cul tural and eth nic in its value-nor ma tive es sence. In the
elec toral di vi sion of Ukraine ac com pa nied by fur ther di ver gence in elec -
tor ate, the fac tor of his tor i cal iden tity started to play a key role. This cat e -
gory was sub stan ti ated in a work by V.Sereda, a so ci ol o gist from Lviv,
and we con sider it to be the most ad e quate con struct for anal y sis of cen -
trif u gal and cen trip e tal forces in con sol i dat ing pro cesses that ap peared
in Ukraine af ter the Or ange Rev o lu tion — we mean di ver gence and con -
sol i da tion of Ukrai nian pop u la tion on the West-East axis. 
In West ern Ukraine, peo ple are con sol i dat ing on the ba sis of their his -
tor i cal mem ory and the cor re spond ing feel ing — “to break out from op -
pres sion of Russia”.
In East ern Ukraine, the con sol i da tion is based on his tor i cal mem o ries
and the cor re spond ing feel ing of “so cial and cul tural ties with Rus sia”.
In Cen tral Ukraine, peo ple bal ance be tween the West and the East
and ex pe ri ence dou ble pres sure of so cial un cer tainty (an omic un cer -
tainty and the dif fi cult choice of his tor i cal iden tity), they are in clined to
the West but can not to tally con sol i date with it be cause of slightly dif fer -
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ent his tor i cal ex pe ri ence. In the dou ble un cer tainty, the cen tral part of
Ukraine is the most prob a ble place to ex pect a grow ing need in an  autho -
ritarian leader, like V.Putin or A.Lukashenko but with Ukrainian  attri -
butes. 
To our mind, the par a dox of na tional char ac ter of dem o cratic de vel op -
ment in Ukraine can be ex plained by the fact that dem o cratic rhet o ric of
both the pop u la tion and the new lead ers can be char ac ter ized by prag -
ma tism. It is more con di tioned by the hope to get sup port and as sis tance 
from the “rich” West than by the ac tual de sire to di rect to dem o cratic
norms of so cial life, we mean such dem o cratic val ues as com mand of law
and equal ity of all be fore the law, re spect of rights and in ter ests of each
cit i zen, free dom of speech, no dis crim i na tion, so cial sol i dar ity, civil ac -
tiv ity, etc. To make these val ues ef fec tive, the pow er ful elite have first and
foremost to demonstrate the corresponding behavior.
Un for tu nately, the new lead ers be gan their work by break ing dem o -
cratic norms. First of all it con cerns the Pres i dent and his too hasty in -
au gu ra tion and nu mer ous dis miss als, and con tin ued as he car ried out
and com mented his pol i cies with out tak ing into ac count  ex ist ing laws.
Then, the key fig ures of the pro cesses for le git i macy of dem o cratic laws,
like Min is ters of Jus tice and Home Af fairs or rep re sen ta tives of Of fice of
Pub lic Pros e cu tor and courts, them selves were the  sub jects of law brea -
k ing scan dals or were caught in a lies, but the upper power did not apply
any sanctions to them. 
The only way to con sol i date so ci ety and turn its de vel op ment into the
di rec tion of real dem o cratic trans for ma tions could be if the lead er ship
made strict con trol over ex e cu tion of the cur rent  law and con duct ing of
per sonal be hav ior in cor re spon dence with  the mod ern (not ar chaic)
dem o cratic values as its top priority.
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